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IS IT BETTER TO BE LOVED OR
FEARED? SOME THOUGHTS ON
LESSONS LEARNED FROM THE
PRESIDENCY OF GEORGE W. BUSH
NEIL KINKOPF*

The first lesson the Bush Presidency has taught us about executive
power is that the topic is exceedingly important. Our conception of
presidential power matters, and the law of presidential power matters.
There are two competing models of presidential power. One is a
unilateral and confrontational vision of presidential power. The other
is a more accommodationist and cooperative model of the allocation
of power between the President and the other branches of the federal
government.
This dichotomy presents a modern version of the question
Machiavelli posed five centuries ago: “Is it better for the Prince to be
loved or feared?”1 In updating Machiavelli’s question, I equate the
unilateral and confrontational model with “being feared” and the
accommodationist and cooperative model with “being loved.”
Machiavelli’s answer was that “it is better to be feared than loved.”2
More precisely, he asserted it is better to be both feared and loved,
3
but such an ideal is not realistically attainable. As between the two,
the prince should prefer being feared to being loved.4
It is now common to regard the unilateral, confrontational model
as the pro-presidential view of the Constitution and the more
5
accommodationist, cooperative model as the pro-congressional view.
* Professor of Law, Georgia State University College of Law.
1. Nicoló Machiavelli, THE PRINCE 58–59 (Quintin Skinner & Russell Price, eds.,
Cambridge University Press, 16th ed. 2004) (1532).
2. See id. at 59 (“[I]f one of them [fear or love] has to be lacking, it is much safer to be
feared than loved.”).
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. See Melissa K. Mathews, The Imperial Presidency: An Examination of President Bush’s
New Emergency Powers, 23 HAMLINE J. PUB. L & POL’Y 455, 457–58 (2002) (describing the
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I am skeptical about this conventional wisdom, which essentially
holds that Machiavelli was correct that it is better to be feared than
loved. Rather, I believe that there is something to be said for
accommodation, even from the perspective of the President. The
Presidency of George W. Bush provides an excellent vehicle for
assessing Machiavelli’s question. It is clear the Bush Administration
chose to be feared rather than loved, which is to say it governed using
the unilateral, confrontational model.
A few examples are illustrative: First, the Bush Administration
followed its own view of how best to proceed regarding detainee
treatment. Administration officials deliberated only among
themselves: not publicly and not with Congress. The Administration
did not go to Congress to seek legal authorization for its policies and
programs. Rather, the Administration unilaterally decided how enemy
combatants would be treated and, in fact, asserted that it was the
President’s prerogative alone, impervious to review by either
6
Congress or the courts. Eventually, Congress passed the Military
7
Commissions Act, which gave the President the authority to conduct
military commissions in precisely the manner the President had
previously ordered. So one might regard the President’s assertion of
power as a useless exercise: he could have been accommodationist
and still received the authority he wanted. But the President’s strategy
was aimed at a different goal. The President followed the unilateral
model not simply to establish the kinds of military commissions he
wanted, but also to vindicate his broad theory of unilateral
presidential power.
Second, the warrantless surveillance program, also known as the
8
Terrorist Surveillance Program, was adopted completely in secret. Its
pro-Congress view, which relies on Constitutional language that explicitly provides that
Congress and the President make decisions in war, and the pro-Executive view, which
emphasizes the “take care” clause and the Constitutional grant of the Executive’s Commanderin-Chief power to justify the President’s special role in times of war).
6. This view is set forth most succinctly in President Bush’s signing statement on the
McCain Amendment, which prohibited military personnel from inflicting “cruel, inhuman, and
degrading treatment” on enemy combatants. See Statement on Signing Department of Defense,
Emergency Supplemental Appropriations to Address Hurricanes in the Gulf of Mexico, and
Pandemic Influenza Act, 2006, 41 WKLY. COMP. PRES. DOC. 52 (Dec. 30, 2005), available at
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=65259. The Administration also argued
essentially this position to the Supreme Court in Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507 (2004) and in
Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557 (2006).
7. 28 U.S.C. § 2241(e).
8. See Constitutional Limitations on Domestic Surveillance: Hearing on Warrantless
Surveillance and the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act Before the H. Comm. of the Judiciary,
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existence eventually was leaked, and a tremendous controversy
followed.9 Members of Congress loudly objected but then largely
capitulated in authorizing the President’s program.10
Third, the 2006 mid-term election can be understood as a public
repudiation of the President’s position on the war in Iraq. The
contemporaneous report of the Iraq Study Group strongly urged a
different, scaled back strategy in Iraq.11 The President nonetheless
responded to this public repudiation by ordering a troop surge.12 Here
again, President Bush acted unilaterally and without regard for the
views of Congress or the public.
Fourth, when the Bush Administration announced its initial
bailout plan for the financial industry, it submitted the plan to
13
Congress, an action that may appear accommodationist. But the
plan’s content was largely unilateral. In essence, President Bush asked
Congress for $700 billion to spend as he saw fit and without oversight
or accountability. Ultimately, Congress approved the plan, but only
after demanding provisions for oversight, limits on executive pay for
participating companies, and a governmental ownership stake in
return for its investments.14
Finally, President Bush’s use of signing statements is consistent
with the view that the President may unilaterally decide what policies
15
are in the best interest of the nation and what course to pursue.
110th Cong. 76 (2007). The program authorized the NSA to monitor—without prior FISC or
other court approval—phone calls and other communications where the NSA believed one
party to the communication was affiliated with Al Qaeda and outside the United States, even if
it was possible that the other party resided in the United States.
9. See James Risen & Eric Lichtblau, Bush Lets U.S. Spy on Callers Without Courts,
N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 16, 2005), available at http://www.nytimes.com/2005/12/16/politics/
16program.html?_r=1&scp=1&sq=Bush_Lets_U.S._Spy_on_Callers_without_Courts&st=cse.
10. See The Protect America Act, Pub. L. No. 110-55, 121 Stat 552 (Aug. 5, 2007)
(Congress approving warrantless surveillance of persons believed to be outside the United
States); The FISA Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-261, 122 Stat 2436 (July 10, 2008)
(same).
11. JAMES A. BAKER III & LEE H. HAMILTON ET AL., THE IRAQ STUDY GROUP REPORT
31, 32–62 (2006), available at http://www.usip.org/isg/iraq_study_group_report/report/1206/.
12. See Michael R. Gordon, Troop ‘Surge’ Took Place Amid Doubt and Debate, N.Y.
TIMES (Aug. 30, 2008), available at http://www.nytimes.com/2008/08/31/washington/
31military.html?fta=y.
13. Eamonn K. Moran, Wall Street Meets Main Street: Understanding the Financial Crisis,
13 N.C. BANKING INST. 5, 78 (2009).
14. Press Room, U.S. Dep’t of Treasury, HP-1207, Treasury Announces TARP Capital
Purchase Program Description (2008), 2008 WL 4562242.
15. For a compilation of the constitutionally based objections contained in President
Bush’s signing statements, see Peter Shane & Neil Kinkopf, Index of Presidential Signing
Statements 2001–2007, 1 ADVANCE 3 supp. (2006), available at http://www.acslaw.org/node/5309.
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Taken together, they demonstrate contempt for the idea that
Congress through law may bind the President.16 The best and most
notorious example is “the Torture Memo,”17 which addressed whether
the President could order the use of torture to interrogate enemy
combatants.
18
A treaty, the Convention Against Torture, binds signatory nations
19
(including the United States) to refrain from employing torture. In
addition, the Anti-Torture Statute makes it a federal crime for United
States personnel to engage in torture outside of the United States.20
The Office of Legal Counsel, nevertheless, issued a memorandum
claiming that either the statute prohibiting the use of torture does not
apply or, if it does apply, that the statute is unconstitutional because
Congress cannot regulate or limit the President’s choice of
interrogation techniques in the War on Terror.21 The memorandum
asserts that Congress has no authority in this area, even though the
Constitution specifically grants Congress the power to define and
punish offenses against the laws of nations,22 which is what the AntiTorture statute aims to do.23
The Constitution gives Congress authority to make rules for the
“Government and Regulation” of the military24 and to provide for
captures on land and at sea.25 All of these powers are obviously

16. Neil Kinkopf, Signing Statements and the President’s Authority to Refuse to Enforce the
Law, 1 ADVANCE 3 (2006).
17. Memorandum from Jay S. Bybee, Assistant Att’y Gen., RE: Standards of Conduct for
Interrogation Under 18 U.S.C. §§ 2340–2340A, to Alberto Gonzales, Counsel to the President
(Aug. 1, 2002) in THE TORTURE PAPERS: THE ROAD TO ABU GHRAIB (Karen J. Greenberg &
Joshua L. Dratel eds., 2005), also available at http://www.humanrightsfirst.org/us_law/etn/
gonzales/memos_dir/memo_20020801_JD_%20Gonz_.pdf.
18. Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment, Open for Signature Dec. 10, 1984, 1465 U.N.T.S. 85, available at
http://www.hrweb.org/legal/cat.html.
19. The United States has signed the Convention Against Torture, but has not yet ratified
it.
20. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2340–2340A.
21. For an annotated copy of the “Terror Memo,” see http://www.aclu.org/pdfs/safefree/
cia_3686_001.pdf.
22. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 10 (granting Congress the power “To define and punish
piracies and felonies committed on the high seas, and offenses against the law of nations”).
23. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 2340–2340A. By both defining torture and establishing offenders
under its jurisdiction as both “nationals” and those “present in the United States,” Congress was
obviously asserting its authority in this area.
24. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 14 (granting Congress the power “To make Rules for the
Government and Regulation of the land and naval Forces”).
25. Id. at cl. 11 (granting Congress the power “To declare war, grant letters of marquee and
reprisal, and make rules concerning captures on land and water”).
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relevant sources of authority for Congress’ power in this area, but the
Bush Administration’s Justice Department was so contemptuous of
the idea that Congress could have any war-related authority that its
memo does not even acknowledge them.
The view expressed in the Torture Memo is fundamentally
incompatible with our constitutional system. Decisions about matters
such as whether we should use torture, and if so, under what
circumstances, are decisions that define us as a nation. They are
therefore decisions that ought to come from a process of deliberation
and approval through the constitutional method of bicameralism and
26
presentment. They are not decisions to be made alone and in secret
by the President. In this respect, the model of presidential power
employed during the Bush Administration affronted our nation’s
system of checks and balances, democratic accountability, and
republican notions of deliberation.
For two reasons, the Torture Memo does not appear to have been
an aberration. First, the Administration executed a memorandum that
withdrew the Torture Memo after it was leaked. In the section dealing
with the President’s power, the memorandum withdrawing the
Torture Memo explained that the whole discussion of torture was
dicta because the President had ordered that torture not be used. The
withdrawing memorandum did not disclaim the substance of the legal
analysis contained in the Torture Memo, but instead only
characterized it as dicta.27 Why did the withdrawing memorandum not
accept that the Torture Memo’s legal analysis was wrong? Likely
because the Administration did not believe that it was: after all, we
know at least one other program, the Terrorist Surveillance Program,28
relied on the same model of unchecked presidential power. Second, a
review of the signing statements that President Bush issued relating to
signing statements discloses a theory of presidential power that can
26. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 2 (“Every bill which shall have passed the House of
Representatives and the Senate, shall, before it become a law, be presented to the President of
the United States . . . .”).
27. See Legal Standards Applicable Under 18 U.S.C. §§ 2340–2340A, Op. Att’y Gen.
(Dec. 30, 2004), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/olc/18usc23402340a2.htm (“Because the
discussion in that memorandum concerning the President’s Commander-in-Chief power and the
potential defenses to liability was—and remains—unnecessary, it has been eliminated from the
analysis that follows. Consideration of the bounds of any such authority would be inconsistent
with the President’s unequivocal directive that United States personnel not engage in torture.”).
28. See Attorney General & Principle Deputy Director of National Intelligence,
Press Briefing of Dec. 19, 2005, available at http://www.dni.gov/20051219_release.htm
(recognizing and debriefing some aspects of the Terrorist Surveillance Program).
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only be justified on the same expansive, unilateral grounds that are set
forth in the Torture Memo.29
So the Bush Administration seems clearly to have chosen fear
over love, confrontation and unilateralism over cooperation. But at
least by one telling, the story has a happy ending. According to this
version of recent history, the Bush view was repudiated and the
correct approach of accommodation prevailed. The first hero of this
story is the Supreme Court, which rejected unilateralism in a series of
30
31
opinions starting with Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, then Rasul v. Bush,
32
33
Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, and finally Boumediene v. Bush. Moreover,
the public also rejected the Bush Administration’s view of
presidential power by electing Barack Obama. No more fear-based
view of presidential power; which is to say, the public has rejected
Machiavelli.
Jack Goldsmith, who headed the Office of Legal Counsel for
almost a year in the Bush Administration and who fought valiantly
during his tenure to uphold the rule of law within the executive
branch, has written a brilliant memoir about his government service—
34
The Terror Presidency. In his account, he draws the conclusion that
the President’s approach to executive power ultimately and inevitably
failed.35
Goldsmith claims that even if the war in Iraq had gone well, the
President and the President’s approach would have failed because he
focused too much on “hard power”—the powers mentioned in the
text of the Constitution, such as the Presidents power as commander
in chief, the veto power, and the pardon power—and not enough on
the President’s “soft power”—the power of the bully pulpit, the power
to persuade people, to lead the nation in deliberation, to gain consent

29. See Kinkopf, supra note 15 (analyzing the legal foundation of President Bush’s signing
statements).
30. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507 (2004) (recognizing governmental authority to detain
enemy combatants, but requiring that U.S. citizens have an opportunity to challenge their
detention before an impartial judge).
31. Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466 (2006) (holding that U.S. courts have jurisdiction to hear
wrongful imprisonment challenges of non-citizens held at Guantanamo Bay).
32. Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557 (2006) (holding that the military commissions
established by the Bush Administration to try detainees at Guantanamo Bay violated the
Uniform Code of Military Justice and the Geneva Convention).
33. Boumediene v. Bush, 128 S. Ct. 2229 (2008) (finding that the Military Commissions Act
of 2006 unconstitutionally restricted Guantanamo Bay prisoners’ right to habeas corpus review).
34. JACK L. GOLDSMITH, THE TERROR PRESIDENCY (2007).
35. Id. at 205–16.
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and consensus for the policies and programs that the President would
then ultimately pursue.36 The Bush Administration, says Professor
Goldsmith, has rejected an approach relying on the President’s soft
powers in favor of a unilateral approach that did not engage in
deliberation but that simply looked every four years for ratification.37
And, because that is contrary to our fundamental commitment to
38
democracy and to civic republican values, it was bound to fail. That is
our happy ending.
I agree with Professor Goldsmith’s argument, drawn from the
work of historians and political scientists like Arthur Schlesinger, that
39
at least in our polity, Machiavelli is wrong. Even from the standpoint
of presidential power, it is better for the President to adopt an
accommodationist model, rather than a unilateral and confrontational
model. But the claim that the unilateral model approach is bound to
fail is an unduly optimistic assertion.
One reason unilateralism is not bound to fail is that Congress is
not a reliable check against presidential power. Congress capitulated
on military commissions, on domestic surveillance, and on the surge in
Iraq. Congress also largely capitulated on the bailout bill. Although
the bailout bill Congress ultimately enacted included a few modest
measures for oversight, Congress basically gave the Administration
what it wanted.40
But why doesn’t Congress stand up as a check on the President?
Madison’s view, expressed in The Federalist and in the structure of the
Constitution, was that parchment barriers and legal constraints on
power would not be worth the parchment on which they were
41
written. Madison argued that the way to constrain power was to
36. Id. at 205.
37. See id. at 205–06, 209–10, 215 (repeatedly noting the Bush Administration’s unilateral
action).
38. See id. at 205–13 (recognizing how a presidential administration’s soft powers are
crucial to the administration’s success and how the Bush Administration focused solely on its
hard powers).
39. See, e.g., id. at 213 (“[T]he ‘truly strong President is not the one who relies on his power
to command but the one who recognizes his responsibility, and opportunity, to enlighten and
pursuade.’” (quoting Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., War and the Constitution: Abraham Lincoln
and Franklin D. Roosevelt, in LINCOLN, THE WAR PRESIDENT: THE GETTYSBURG LECTURES
145, 174 (Gabor S. Boritt ed., 1992))).
40. See generally Emergency Economic Stabilization—Energy Improvement and
Extension—Tax Extenders and Alternative Minimum Tax Relief, Pub. L. No. 110-343,
122 Stat. 3765 (2008) (bill passed by Congress to attempt to redress America’s economic crisis).
41. THE FEDERALIST NO. 48, at 274 (James Madison) (E.H. Scott ed., 1898);
see also, e.g., U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 5 (granting to the House of Representatives the “sole
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structure government so that each institution would have its own
ambition, which would counteract the ambitions of the others.42 Thus,
Madison envisioned Congress’ institutional ambitions counteracting
43
the power of the Executive Branch.
But Madison’s idealistic system of checks and balances relies on
44
institutional loyalty, which does not take into account party loyalty.
Congressional members who want to get reelected, if they are from
the President’s own party, pursue their own ambition and self-interest
by making sure the President is successful.45 Thus, these self-interested
members are less likely to check the President’s power than Madison
46
envisioned. Otherwise, the public would lose confidence in the
President’s decisions and in the political party he represents, which
could cause Congress to change hands and which disserves the selfserving congressional party members. While this dynamic is
important, for the last two years, we have had congressional majorities
from a different party than the President. And yet Congress still has
not acted as a significant check on presidential power. Why not?
The Executive Branch enjoys three formidable institutional
advantages that have undermined the capacity of Congress to act as a
check on the President. First, the Executive Branch houses nearly all
of the government’s expertise and knowledge. This resides in the
agencies of the federal government, and they are under the control of
the President. So the Executive Branch controls the information
collected by agencies and can, and over the last eight years certainly
has, manipulated that information by disclosing what is useful and
47
withholding what is not.

Power of Impeachment”); id. at art. I, § 3, cl. 6 (giving the Senate the power to try
impeachments); id. at art I, § 8 (enumerating the powers of Congress).
42. THE FEDERALIST NO. 51, at 286 (James Madison) (E.H. Scott ed., 1898).
43. See id.
44. Daryl J. Levinson & Richard H. Pildes, Separation of Parties, Not Powers, 119 HARV.
L. REV. 2311, 2316–25 (2006).
45. See id. at 2319 (congressmen, instead of having ambitions that compete with the
President’s, form “incipient organizations that t[ake] sides on contested policy and ideological
issues” and compete to “marshal support for their agendas,” which leads to “the organization of
enduring parties that . . . facilitate alliances among groups of like-minded elected officials and
politically mobilized citizens on a national scale.”).
46. Id. at 2323–24.
47. See, e.g., Sidney A. Shapiro, “Political” Science: Regulatory Science After the Bush
Administration, 4 Duke J. Const. L. & Pub. Pol’y 31, 31–33 (2009) (discussing the Bush
Administration’s manipulation of information collected and released by government agencies).

DO NOT DELETE

2009]

6/15/2009 3:27:55 PM

LESSONS LEARNED: EXECUTIVE POWER

53

Second, members of the House of Representatives are perpetually
campaigning for reelection, and therefore the institution is chronically
distracted. Members of the House of Representatives have to run for
reelection every two years and must constantly fundraise and
campaign. They never stop running, so they always have one foot in
their home district to campaign, and the other foot back in
Washington to engage in policy deliberations. But that is a serious
disadvantage. The demands of campaigning seriously impair the
ability of even conscientious legislators to engage in continuing,
rather than sporadic, oversight.
A third factor that is sometimes undervalued is a competing
ambition of many members of Congress. Their ambition is not to be
powerful as members of Congress or as part of a coequal institution
that checks the President’s power, but to be powerful period. Ten
senators considered running for President this time around, plus
48
several Representatives. So what position should these presidential
hopefuls take while serving in the Congress? Because they may hold
the Executive Office in the near future, they may be unwilling to limit
the President’s powers that they themselves may hope someday to
employ. It is unlikely that Congress can act as a check on presidential
power when so many of its members hope to one day hold the office
of President, or would be happy to give up their current job to serve
in a President’s cabinet.
Members of Congress themselves realize this. Senator Carl Levin
49
was asked how Congress could check the President’s power. His
answer was “‘[w]e need a Democrat in the White House.’”50 It was not,
“There is a lot we can do here in Congress, we can hold hearings and
we can enact legal regimes to prohibit or at least inhibit excesses.”
Fortunately, even before the public rejected the Bush
Administration’s model of unilateralism by electing President Obama,
51
the Court did the same. The Hamdi decision—the first in the recent
line of decisions checking presidential power—is interesting for when
48. See, e.g., Susan Page, President’s Job Gets Harder When 10 Senators Want It,
USA TODAY, July 27, 2007, available at http://www.usatoday.com/news/washington/2005-07-27president-job-harder-campaign-08_x.htm (listing senators who indicated interest in running for
presidency).
49. Jonathan Mahler, After the Imperial Presidency, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Nov. 9, 2008,
available at http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=940DE4DA1F3BF93AA35752C1A
96E9C8B63&sec=&spon=&pagewanted=11.
50. Id. (quoting Senator Carl Levin).
51. See supra notes 30–33.
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it was decided. After the case was argued, but before it was decided,
the revelation of photographs of Abu Ghraib and the leak of the
Torture Memo became public.52 What the Court would have said had
those events not occurred is sheer speculation. But it is not far-fetched
to believe that they had some effect on the way the Court looked at
the issues in that case and at the issues that came up in the later cases.
But even setting that aside, the most recent case, Boumediene v.
Bush,53 finally declared that enemy combatants detained at
Guantanamo Bay are entitled to petition for a writ of habeas corpus.54
Yet it took over six years after the beginning of the War on Terror
merely to establish this fairly preliminary point, and Boumediene still
does not tell us what rights are guaranteed under the Great Writ. In
the seven years of the President’s unilateral authorization of enemy
combatant detainment, the judiciary has not begun to address these
questions. So what kind of constraint has the Court really put on
presidential power?
According to the happy-ending version of the story, the public
repudiated fear by electing Barack Obama. Perhaps, but what would
have happened if the war in Iraq had gone differently? What if
inspectors had found weapons of mass destruction loaded onto a
cargo ship? What would have happened if we had captured Osama
bin Laden? The public’s view of executive power might look very
different than it does now.
Given this uncertainty, how should presidential powers be
checked? It is possible that structural safeguards could have some
effect. On the occasions when Congress has been able to stand up
effectively to the President, it has enacted structural constraints; that
is, legal constraints on the exercise of presidential power. For example,
55
after the Civil War, Congress enacted the Tenure in Office Act and
adopted the Civil Service System.56 These measures served as effective

52. Boumediene v. Bush was argued on December 5, 2007, whereas the Torture Memo was
leaked in 2004. See Dana Priest & R. Jeffrey Smith, Memo Offered Justification for Use of
Torture: Justice Dept Gave Advice in 2002, WASH. POST, June 8, 2004, at A1, available at
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A23373-2004Jun7.html (Washington Post’s first
article regarding the Torture Memo).
53. Boumediene v. Bush, 128 S. Ct. 2229 (2008).
54. Id. at 2277.
55. An Act Regulating the Tenure of Certain Civil Offices, 14 Stat. 430 (1867)
(repealed 1887).
56. An Act To Regulate and Improve the Civil Service of the United States, 22 Stat. 403
(1883).
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constraints on some abuses of presidential power, at least until the
Tenure in Office Act was partly repudiated.57
Watergate, however, provides a cautionary example. In the wake
of that scandal, a wave of reforms swept over Washington. Congress
enacted a vast array of legislation to prevent executive abuses of
58
power. Yet here we are thirty years later, worrying about the same
issues. In light of this history, it is not surprising that Senator Levin
would think not of legislation but of politics as the most effective
check against the abuse of power.
It is tempting to consider the lesson of the Bush Administration to
be that unilateral attempts to expand executive power are doomed to
fail. But it is important not to indulge this myth because doing so will
only further diminish the capacity of the public and other government
institutions to check against abuses in the future.

57. An Act to Repeal Certain Sections of the Revised Statutes of the United States
Relating to the Appointment of Civil Officers, 24 Stat. 500 (1887); see also Myers v. United
States, 272 U.S. 52 (1926) (finding Tenure in Office Act unconstitutional as violating principles
of separation of powers).
58. See, e.g., Thomas E. Harris, Implementing the Federal Campaign Finance Laws,
67 NAT’L CIVIC REV. 217 (1978) (discussing the campaign finance reform as well as the public
ethics legislation responding to the Watergate scandal).

